Do Courts Matter? by Carter, Stephen L.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 90 Issue 6 
1992 
Do Courts Matter? 
Stephen L. Carter 
Yale University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stephen L. Carter, Do Courts Matter?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1216 (1992). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol90/iss6/4 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
DO COURTS MATTER?t 
Stephen L. Carter* 
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 
By Gerald N. Rosenberg. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
1991. Pp. xii, 425. $29.95. 
One of the nation's most prominent journalists recently referred to 
the President's ability to staff the Supreme Court as "his single most 
important duty" 1 - ranking, it seems, ahead of the duty to keep the 
peace or the duty to administer the affairs of the federal government. 
One can understand that judgment, whether or not one shares it, for 
the received wisdom of contemporary American politics is that the 
Supreme Court wields enormous power to affect the future course of 
American society. Thus, the bitter battles over who gets to serve on 
the Supreme Court do not, as Robert Bork would have it, constitute 
part of a larger culture war;2 rather, the struggles proceed from the 
widespread perception that the outcome matters, and matters a lot. In 
our constitutional mythos, the selection of the right Justice - or the 
wrong one - can change the course of American history, moving us 
forward, setting us back, holding the course, or charting a new one. 
Since the pioneering work of Robert A. Dahl, most theorists have 
viewed the Court as one of many actors in the development of national 
policies on a variety of issues. 3 The implication is that the Justices are 
serious players in the game of societal transformation. Some scholars, 
Alexander Bickel to the fore, have been more cautious, suggesting a 
Court of limited ability to make changes.4 Bruce Ackerman, for ex-
ample, has compared the Court to a group of brakemen sitting in the 
last car of a train, able to make it stop but not to make it go.5 Yet in 
the popular image - the one enshrined by the political rhetoric of left 
t © 1992 by Stephen L. Carter. 
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University. B.A. 1976, Stanford; J.D. 
1979, Yale. - Ed. 
1. Anthony Lewis, Wreck or Rescue?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992, § 4, at 17. 
2. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 343 (1990). 
3. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Role of the Supreme Court As 
a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). 
4. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
5. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 546-
47 (1989). 
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and right alike - the Justices ride right up in the engine and choose 
which track to take. 
Political scientist Gerald Rosenberg, 6 in his new book The Hollow 
Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, challenges this con-
ventional wisdom. Rosenberg claims that the courts matter a good 
deal less than our rhetoric insists - or, more formally, that their 
power to produce significant social change, whether directly through 
their own decrees or indirectly through sparking other societal forces 
into activity, is less than Americans have come to believe. 
Rosenberg erects two models of judicial behavior: the Dynamic 
Court model, under which Supreme Court decisions exert important 
influence on the direction of the society, and the Constrained Court 
model, under which various limitations on the Court's power make 
such influence minimal. After analyzing a variety of hotly debated 
constitutional issues, Rosenberg comes out for a modified version of 
the much-maligned Constrained Court model which, he says, "best 
capture[s] the capacity of the courts to produce significant social re-
form" (p. 336). In fact, Rosenberg suggests that all the old metaphors 
of judicial weakness, from Hamilton to Bickel, are truer than today's 
scholars seem to think - implying that our politics, and even our 
scholarship, should be little concerned with the output of the courts 
because there is little that the courts can actually accomplish. 
A part of the American mythos already accepts this claim, for 
competing sides in any struggle over constitutional meaning always 
argue that the law is already as they say it should be. The norms of 
legal argument hardly permit anything else, which is perhaps what 
Publius really had in mind in insisting in Federalist No. 78 that the 
judicial branch possesses neither force nor will. That the courts sim-
ply construe the law is hornbook civics. Even if smart theorists know 
that it is nonsense, the public, which probably also knows better, still 
cherishes the ideal of judicial weakness, which is one reason that polit-
ical rhetoric about "strict construction" - fortunately, never defined 
- plays so well on the stump. The effort to show that the courts do 
not make new law has led to some very peculiar results, such as the 
insistence by former Attorney General Edwin Meese that Brown v. 
Board of Education 7 represented the rediscovery of an original under-
standing that Plessy v. Ferguson s had ignored.9 Still, such an argu-
ment is much in keeping with the ideal that the courts possess little 
power in American life. 
6. Assistant Professor of Political Science and Instructor in Law, University of Chicago. 
Professor Rosenberg was a student of mine in a seminar on Separation of Powers at Yale Law 
School in 1983. 
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
8. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
9. Edwin Meese III, The Battle for the Constitution, POLY. REv., Winter 1986, at 32, 34. 
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But hardly anyone really believes this. Most Americans seem to 
think the courts have, or should have, sufficient authority to protect 
favored "constitutional" rights. The mythos of judicial weakness is 
most emphatically brushed aside during the campaigns (there is no 
other word) for and against the candidates (still no other word) for 
election (yet again, no other word) to the Supreme Court. At those 
defining moments of the people's relationship to their judicial branch, 
we discover all too often that we want not a least dangerous branch, 
nor even an independent one - rather, we want a branch possessed of 
considerable power yet willing to exercise that power only in accord-
ance with our will. By the rhetoric of the President and the Senate, at 
least, servant is not too extreme a word to describe the judiciary's rela-
tionship to the public. If our fondest desire is to staff the bench with 
people whose votes on crucial issues are promised in advance, we cer-
tainly cannot use the word judge to describe the people the process 
produces.10 But our tendency to treat the Justices as servants surely is 
bottomed on our fear of their power. 
Rosenberg suggests that this fear is unfounded - that the courts 
are less powerful engines of change than we seem to think. The end-
less squabbling over judicial personnel, Rosenberg implies, wastes 
enormous energy; if we wish to influence public policy, we should not 
be so interested in the courts, for they cannot effect significant changes 
in American society. According to Rosenberg, the Supreme Court 
might be part of a social movement, but it is rarely the motive force 
and never the key player. 
Rosenberg's analysis of Brown v. Board of Education, the paradig-
matic case of judicial involvement in social change, best illuminates his 
thesis. In the orthodox view, Brown was a watershed, the crucial de-
velopment in the movement to abolish legal segregation. Rosenberg, 
however, seems to delight in challenging the orthodoxy: "[T]here is 
little evidence that Brown helped produce positive change," he tells us, 
but "there is some evidence that it hardened resistance to civil rights 
among both elites and the white public" (p. 155). Rosenberg offers 
evidence that rates of school desegregation changed little during the 
decade after Brown, as the courts pressed their lonely battle for 
supremacy (pp. 49-57). In the particular case of the South, he insists, 
"virtually nothing happened" (p. 52); statistics on segregation were as 
dismal in 1964 as they had been in 1954. Other commentators have 
pointed to the Court's unanimity and steadfastness as critical to gen-
eral obedience of the Brown decrees, but Rosenberg's god is data: 
"Despite the unanimity and forcefulness of the Brown opinion, the 
Supreme Court's reiteration of its position and its steadfast refusal to 
yield, its decree was flagrantly disobeyed" (p. 52). The enactment of 
10. The themes in this paragraph are developed more extensively in Stephen L. Carter, The 
Confirmation Mess, Revisited, 84 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 962 (1990). 
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the 1964 Civil Rights Act, he says, tipped the balance - and rather 
dramatically at that, for the Southern states, with federal funding at 
issue, at last began to yield. 11 
The trouble, according to Rosenberg, is that the Dynamic Court 
model simply didn't work for school desegregation. The courts, he 
says, were constrained by a variety of rather Bickelian factors, notably 
the lack during the first decade after Brown of "the active support of 
political elites" (p. 74). The equivocation at the national level, he ar-
gues, encouraged private citizens and local government actors (and 
sometimes lower courts) to continue their resistance at the state level. 
"The only way to overcome such opposition," he writes, "is from a 
change of heart by electors and by national political leaders" (p. 81)-
a change reflected in subsequent legislation. In the desegregation 
realm, he concludes, "it is clear that paradigms based on court efficacy 
are simply wrong" (p. 105). 
Rosenberg does not rest with this astonishing rebuttal of the re-
ceived wisdom on Brown,- instead, he trots out a variety of data in an 
effort to demolish one icon of liberal constitutionalism after another. 
His dismissal of the efficacy of the Court's effort to reform criminal 
procedure is succinct: "The revolution failed" (p. 335). Women's 
rights? There is, Rosenberg says, "little evidence that Court action 
was of help in ending discrimination against women" (p. 247). He is 
equally unpersuaded that clever litigation strategies can lead to liberal 
results by eliciting broad judicial readings of remedial statutes: "Envi-
ronmentalists," Rosenberg concludes, "made only modest gains 
through the courts .... " 12 Even on reapportionment, cited by John 
Hart Ely as the one area where court decisions once implemented can 
never be overturned, 13 Rosenberg is unconvinced: "Reapportionment 
. . . did not always, or even often, achieve the goals the reformers 
desired" (p. 301). 
On today's hottest of hot-button issues, abortion, Rosenberg runs 
into some difficulty. He concedes that the courts have had some effect, 
for the number of abortions has increased since Roe v. Wade 14 was 
decided in 1973 (pp. 178-80). But they increased in the years before 
Roe as well, and public opinion on abortion,. he tells us, has changed 
11. P. 52. Rosenberg carries the same analysis through other areas in which legislative ac-
tion followed court action by many years, including voting (pp. 57-63), housing (pp. 67-70), and 
public accommodations (pp. 65-67). 
12. P. 278. William N. Eskridge has argued that congressional overrides of Supreme Court 
statutory interpretations are relatively rare not because the Court is powerful, but because the 
Justices are unlikely to interpret a statute in a way that is contrary to the preferences of the 
current (as against the enacting) Congress. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme 
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 378 (1991). If this is so, it implies a 
further limitation on the litigation strategy, for litigants will rarely obtain from the Court what 
they could not obtain iri the political process. 
13. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 121 (1980). 
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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little over the past twenty years (pp. 182-89). Moreover, important 
elements of the medical establishment have always opposed abortion, 
or supported it only weakly. In fact, Rosenberg tells us, in the years 
since Roe, "abortion services have remained centered in metropolitan 
areas and in those states which reformed their abortion laws and regu-
lations prior to the Court's decisions" (p. 195). The key change in 
abortion practice has come in the marketing of health care services -
for what Roe really created was legal space for a new provider, the 
abortion clinic (pp. 195-99). For the rest of the medical world, busi-
ness has continued much as before, suggesting that, were Roe v. Wade 
to be overturned and many states subsequently to outlaw abortion, the 
principal market event would be the disappearance of the clinics. This 
would seem to be a genuine change wrought directly by judicial edict, 
and thus a challenge to his theory, but Rosenberg's conclusion re-
mains the same: "[T]he Court is far less responsible for the changes 
that occurred than most people think" (p. 201). 
Rosenberg goes beyond the assertion that litigation strategies 
rarely if ever produce significant change. He argues, correctly, that 
they are often counterproductive, for they can distort perceptions 
about where resources are needed (pp. 339-42). In the particular case 
of abortion, Rosenberg notes that "reliance on the Court seriously 
weakened the political efficacy of pro-choice forces. After the 1973 
decisions, many pro-choice activists simply assumed they had won and 
stopped their pro-choice activity .... The political organization and 
momentum that had changed laws nationwide dissipated in celebra-
tion of the Court victory" (p. 339). The result, of course, was that 
pro-choice forces abandoned the political arena to pro-life forces -
and then professed surprise when pro-life forces won important electo-
ral victories. The current broad public support for at least some abor-
tion rights has arisen largely because of the more recent decision of 
pro-choice forces to return to the grass roots - the place, Rosenberg 
tells us, where real social changes take place (p. 341). 
There, in fine, is Rosenberg's thesis: the courts can work some 
changes in the society, but far fewer than most people seem to think. 
People, not the courts, make social movements. It is not the Supreme 
Court that integrated schools, he insists, but a Congress that enacted 
legislation to take away federal funds from schools that would not 
change. It is not the Supreme Court that created broad abortion 
rights, but a coalition of activists working at the grass roots level all 
across America. As for criminal justice, the court decisions that are so 
politically controversial are widely disregarded and have barely regis-
tered any effect at all in data about crime and punishment - presuma-
bly because, unlike desegregation and abortion, the issue lacks a 
powerful constituency. 
In a sense, this thesis should have lost the capacity to surprise, for 
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constitutional theorists should have understood since Bickel that 
courts operate under a variety of constraints that make them relatively 
inefficient engines of social change. But a misreading of the relation-
ship of the Supreme Court to the civil rights movement has combined 
with the typical elite impatience with ordinary politics to lead an en-
tire generation of scholars into a dubious effort to explain how a wide 
variety of rights are already in the Constitution - as though, should 
the courts agree, the social changes that the scholars seek would, like 
magic, come to pass. If, as Rosenberg insists, courts cannot bring 
about major social changes, then the great bulk of contemporary con-
stitutional theory, which assumes otherwise, is a waste. 
Although it occasionally drowns the reader in a sea of statistics, 
The Hollow Hope is engagingly written and thoughtfully reasoned. 
Still, Rosenberg must overstate his thesis somewhat to make his point, 
which is a shame, because the world would be far better were matters 
as he describes them. Abortion, he ought to concede, is simply not a 
good case for his theory - but then, it is not a good case for most 
constitutional theories. As for Brown, Rosenberg gets so caught up in 
the arcana of the measurable (e.g., what was the rate of change in 
contributions to the NAACP?) that he gives short shrift to the deci-
sion's vital importance as a confidence-building device for those who 
were fighting for reform. 
To be sure, Rosenberg does not claim that court decisions are 
meaningless, and he readily concedes that they possess a certain sym-
bolic significance. Even if Rosenberg sometimes carries his thesis too 
far, it is refreshing to find someone at last looking at the data rather 
than resting on the usual assertions of vast judicial power. For de-
cades now, conservative critics of the Supreme Court have charged 
that the Justices are usurping the political functions of the people's 
elected representatives, and social reformers have complained bitterly 
that the Court is no longer a reliable ally. If Rosenberg is right, how-
ever, there is less to worry about than -critics on either side have as-
sumed, for the courts make little policy, or, rather, the policy they 
make makes little difference. Even if the courts actively try to make 
policy - as Rosenberg concedes they do, and often - they do not 
succeed. 
Or, more properly, if they do succeed, they succeed because of the 
interplay of forces larger than themselves. A court might join itself to 
a social movement, as the Warren Court did in Brown v. Board of 
Education and as some would argue the Burger Court did in Roe v. 
Wade and its progeny (although others would say that it is the Rehn-
quist Court that joined forces with a social movement in Webster v. 
Reproductive Services 15 and its progeny). But Rosenberg's data con-
firm what Bickel and others taught long ago: the actions of the polit-
15. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
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ical branches of government ultimately determine whether society 
changes or not. The courts, acting alone, change almost nothing. 
It must not be forgetten, however, that the courts can do a great 
deal to stymie change- a point that Rosenberg mentions (pp. 15-16) 
but does not emphasize. During the thirty-two years of what is known 
today as the Lochner era, the Supreme Court struck down one piece of 
economic regulatory legislation after another, hindering the Progres-
sive movement, and, for several years, the New Deal. In the long run, 
the proponent of the Constrained Court thesis might respond, the pop-
ular will prevailed, and the Justices finally sustained broad govern-
ment powers to intervene in the economy. But, in Keynes' famous 
phrase (imported into the constitutional dialogue by Robert Bork), in 
the long run we will all be dead. 16 In the short run, contra Rosenberg, 
courts do matter, and they matter a lot, even if they are far more pow-
erful as brakes than as engines. 
Nowadays, government power is generally conceded to be plenary 
in the absence of a specific claim of right. Where government regula-
tion is most popular, mainly in the realm of the eco~omy, there are 
few surviving rights to be interposed, and, thus, few opportunities for 
the Justices to slow things down.17 So commentators who decry the 
fact that the Justices are no longer reliable allies are thinking mostly of 
the cases in which the Court is asked to serve as engine - for exam-
ple, Bowers v. Hardwick 18 - but refuses to do so. 
Elsewhere, I have argued that the result in Bowers is not defensible 
as long as Griswold v. Connecticut 19 is good law.20 And yet, if Rosen-
berg is right, the judicial choice to surrender its role as engine of social 
reform should not bring about the loud cries of doom that it does. 
There is no logically necessary relationship between the courts and 
social reform. Those who seek to change the world should seek what 
allies they can find; they should not be seduced by what is rapidly 
becoming ancient history into thinking that the Court is the most im-
portant branch to capture. 
For a brief moment of the nation's history, bounded roughly by 
Brown and Roe, the Supreme Court was a reliable ally of those who 
style themselves progressive. This period, which did not even last two 
decades, has changed the way America thinks about its courts, and, in 
consequence, has changed the way that those who want to change 
America think about its courts, too. But for most of the nation's his-
16. Robert H. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383, 390 (1985). 
17. First Amendment rights are notable exceptions, for regulation of speech seems as popular 
as ever, all across the political spectrum. 
18. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
20. See Stephen L. Carter, The Inaugural Development Fund Lectures: Scientific Liberalism, 
Scientistic Law, 69 OR. L. REV. 471, 483-84 (1990). 
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tory, the Justices have been indifferent to social change or have 
worked to prevent it. Any other mindset would be surprising. Courts, 
like the law they interpret, are backward-looking, which renders 
judges essentially conservative creatures. In other words, it is Brown, 
for all its shining glory, that was the historical accident; the more re-
cent jurisprudence, dismal though it often is, represents business as 
usual. 
For nearly all of the nation's history, those who wanted to change 
America have stubbornly avpided the courts. True, reformers caught 
a break when Charles Hamilton Houston and William Hastie, two of 
the canniest legal minds of this century, devised an a.Iltisegregation 
strategy that paid fealty to the law's own conservatism by appealing to 
values that judges were scarcely able to deny, and Thurgood Marshall, 
among the greatest of oral advocates, led the legal team that was able 
to make it persuasive. But not every cause, even every good one, can 
craft an argument that so sounds in established legal principle. Some-
times, the principles the courts would need to embrace to give judg-
ment are simply too outlandish, too unconnected to anything 
resembling "law." Recent efforts to avoid this truth by treating law as 
mere arbitrary power and bounds on judicial discretion as illusory 
often read less like serious analysis than like sour grapes. 
It may be just as well if the Supreme Court turns out to matter less 
than was once thought. We live in an era in which it is thought pecu-
liar when potential Justices correctly insist that judicial independence 
forbids discussing with the Senate Judiciary Conimittee their views on 
issues likely to come before the Court - even though the only nomi-
nee ever to hold such discussions in any detail, Robert Bork, was de-
feated. That the Senators inquire is hardly surprising, since the last 
two Presidents have been so candid in their ideological crusades to 
staff the federal courts with judges who will vote as their Administra-
tion prefers. But partisan battles over which way judges should prom-
ise to vote have little to do with principle and nothing to do with law. 
Liberalism once stood for an ideal of judging as an activity beyond 
ordinary politics. Nowadays, however, it too often stands for electing 
legislators in the guise of selecting judges. 
We live in an era, moreover, when serious charges of sexual harass-
ment against a Supreme Court nominee are treated as just another 
occasion for partisanship - and, in particular, as a chance for con-
servatives to prove their ideological bona tides by doing their best to 
trash the accuser rather than making even a colorable effort to investi-
gate the actual charges. Once upon a time, conservatism stood for a 
certain decorum in public officials and certain standards of conduct in 
public and private life. Nowadays, however, it too often stands only 
for winning, at whatever cost to truth might be necessary - and, in 
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this case, the name of the game is getting the courts staffed with people 
who will vote the right way. 
In our political world, it seems, left and right share a faith that 
judges should rule on cases before hearing them - indeed, before tak-
ing the bench. In so crazy a world, it is probably not a good thing if 
those judges actually have the power to do very much. Which is why 
everyone who takes law seriously should be praying that Rosenberg is 
right. 
